College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
W&M Law Student Publications

Student Publications and Awards

2004

Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants:
How the Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy
Both Supports and Opposes a Moratorium
Sara A. Aliabadi

Repository Citation
Aliabadi, Sara A., "Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants: How the Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both
Supports and Opposes a Moratorium" (2004). W&M Law Student Publications. 8.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/studentpubs/8

Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/studentpubs

GENDER ASSIGNMENT SURGERY FOR INTERSEXED INFANTS:
HOW THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PRIVACY
BOTH SUPPORTS AND OPPOSES A MORATORIUM
Sara A. Aliabadi 1

I. INTRODUCTION
"Don't try to cut us up or change us or shame us or hide us,"
cautions intersexed individual Hida Viloria.2 Viloria is among those
Americans 3 who view the practice of performing gender assignment
surgery on intersexed infants as unnecessary, physically harmful, and
psychologically damaging to its "victims." 4 The procedure of gender
assignment surgery, which is traditionally performed on intersexed
individuals early in their infancy, is an effort to surgically alter the
genitalia of infants born with ambigious genitalia so that they conform to
that of a normal male or female. Many researchers and physicians
consider gender assignment surgery to be a valid and appropriate form
of treatment for intersexed individuals. 5
However, intersex
organizations analogize the surgeries to female circumcision and sexual
1 J.D. candidate, The William and Mary School of Law, 2005; A.B., Princeton
University, 2002. I would like to thank Professor Donald Tortorice, at The William and
Mary School of Law, for his teaching and support; Professor Donald Drakeman, at
Princeton University, for his guidance and inspiration; Drs. Hossein Aliabadi and Galen
M. Schauer, for their advice and assistance; and Ian Ralby, for his comments and
suggestions. This article was presented as part of the 2004 Benjamin Rush Symposium
at The William and Mary School of Law.
2 Intersex Babies: Controversy Over Operating to Change Ambiguous Genitalia,
(ABC News television broadcast, Apr. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Intersex Babies].
Some of these Americans belong to the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA),
an organization that opposes early surgery and contends that intervention should be
postponed for intersexed children until they are mature enough to make their own
choices about surgical sex assignments.
The ISNA website can be found at:
http://www.isna.org.
4 Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First,Do No Harm" - The Fiction of Legal ParentalConsent
to Genital-NormalizingSurgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 469,
469, 488 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Peter Lee & Philip A. Gruppuso, Point/Counterpoint,Should Cosmetic
Surgery Be Performed on the Genitals of Children Born with Ambiguous Genitals?, 16
PHYSICIAN'S WEEKLY

31

(Aug.

16,

1999), at http://www.physiciansweekly.com/

archive/99/08_16_99/pc.html. See also Robert M. Blizzard, Intersex Issues: A Series of
Continuing Conundrums, 110 PEDIATRICS 616, 618 (2002).

2004]

Gender Assignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants

171

abuse, 6 asserting that the surgery is premature, traumatic, and a form of
mutilation. Some propose a moratorium on performing the surgeries on
intersexed infants, arguing that such surgeries should be postponed until7
intersexed individuals are mature enough to consent to the procedures.
Others argue that a moratorium would create more problems than it
solves 8 by exposing intersexed individuals to psychological harm during
their formative years. They suggest that early surgery can help offer9
intersexuals "emotional closure" with respect to their intersex condition
and spare them some of the psychosocial harm that may result from the
appearance of their malformed genitalia. 10
America's reproductive rights jurisprudence contains extensive
discourse on the substantive due process right of privacy that bears
directly on the controversial arguments surrounding gender assignment
surgery for intersexed infants. However, American legal scholars have
yet to conduct a thorough examination of gender assignment surgery
through the lens of the privacy doctrine. This gap in the literature may
be explained by the fact that American society and its scholars
traditionally have analyzed gender assignment surgeries in a medical
context, and as a result have deemphasized the civil liberties implicated
by these procedures. Specifically, the limited legal scholarship that has
been published on gender assignment surgery focuses primarily on
issues of medical malpractice, negligence, and informed consent as they
relate to the procedure."' Media coverage of gender assignment
surgeries also focuses on its clinical and ethical, rather than the
constitutional, implications. Perhaps most importantly, no American
court has yet considered the subject. 12
6

Julie Cole, Legal Issues on the Treatment of Children with Intersex Conditions (Apr.

6, 2003), available at http://home.vicnet.net.au/~aissg/legal-issues.htm.

7 Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:

Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants With Ambiguous
Genitalia?,7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17 (2000).

8 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 618.
9 Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, Pediatric Urologist, Pediatric Urology Associates,
in Minneapolis, Min. (Oct. 10, 2004).
10 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 619. See also Intersex Babies, supra note 2.
11 See, e.g., Laura Hermer, ParadigmsRevised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & The
Law, 11 ANN. HEALTH L. 195,214-36 (2002).
12 However, in 1999, the Constitutional Court of Columbia, the country's highest
court, issued two rulings against gender assignment surgery for intersexed infants. The
Court held that the surgery should be postponed until the child is mature enough to
consent, and that intersexuals constitute a protected minority. Beh & Diamond, supra
note 7, 22 n.92.
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Approximately one in every 2,000 children is born with an intersex
condition. 13 However, virtually no legal work adequately addresses the
fundamental privacy issues that underlie gender assignment surgery.
This Note attempts to explore this issue. Part II provides an overview of
the medical background of intersex conditions. Having established the
current medical standard for treatment of intersexed individuals, Part III
offers a brief discussion on the current state of the law. Part IV then
traces the Supreme Court's historical recognition of the fundamental
right to privacy. Part V applies the privacy doctrine to the debate on
whether to impose a moratorium on early gender assignment surgery. It
also considers other issues, such as the implications of whether the
procedure is deemed to be performed for health or cosmetic reasons, and
whether a moratorium on the surgery would be overinclusive and
underinclusive. This Note concludes that although the fundamental right
of privacy can both support and oppose arguments for a legal
moratorium on gender assignment surgery, the imposition of such a
moratorium would be premature and unwise at this time in light of the
lack of conclusive studies on the subject.

II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Meaning of "Intersex"
Even a cursory glance at the academic and medical literature on
"intersex" conditions reveals that there is no single, agreed-upon
definition of this widely-used term. An ethicist provides a definition of
intersexuality that highlights the term's inherent lack of clarity:
[I]ntersexuality constitutes a range of anatomical conditions in
which an individual's anatomy mixes key masculine anatomy
with key feminine anatomy. One quickly runs into a problem,
however, when trying to define "key" or "essential" feminine
and masculine anatomy. In fact, any close study of sexual
anatomy results in a loss of faith that there is a simple, "natural"
sex distinction that will not break down in the face of certain
13 Hermer, supra note 11, at 195. See also Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 17.
Common intersex conditions include clitoromegaly, micropenis, hypospadias, complete
androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS), partial androgen insensitivity syndrome (PALS)
and congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAM), the most common intersex condition.
Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, Pediatric Urologist, Pediatric Urology Associates, in
Minneapolis, Min. (Oct. 25, 2003). To learn more about intersex conditions, see
http://www.isna.org.
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anatomical, behavioral, or philosophical challenges. Sometimes
the phrase "ambiguous genitalia" is substituted for
"intersexuality," but this does not solve the problem .
because we are still left struggling with the question of what
should count as "ambiguous." (How small should a baby's penis
be before it counts as "ambiguous?")14
For the purposes of this Note, the term "intersexed" is used in a broad
sense to describe those persons who possess the physical characteristics
of both sexes in their gonadal, genital, or reproductive structures or their
chromosomal composition. 15
A multitude of intersex conditions and corresponding genital
abnormalities exist, ranging in scope and severity, and such conditions
and abnormalities can arise through many avenues. 16 A thorough
examination of the physical causes and manifestations of intersexuality
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief overview of the
physiological influences that are responsible for normal genetic
development, and of the basic manner in which intersex conditions
develop, gives context to how fundamental substantive due process
rights doctrine applies to the debate over the surgery.
One group of medical professionals explained the process of genetic
development as it affects intersex infants as follows:
Before about 6 weeks' gestation, male and female embryos
develop undifferentiated gonadal tissue and have primordial
structures with the potential to produce either male or female
genitalia. The genital appearance of the newborn is largely
determined by the presence or absence of genetic and hormonal
influences responsible for the active process of male
differentiation. The fetus tends to develop as a female in the
absence of these male influences. Intersex conditions arise
because of an abnormality along the male pathway that
interferes with complete masculinization or, in the case of a

14

Alice Domurat Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex'"- or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues

in the Treatment of Intersexuality, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 24, 26 (May/June

1998).
15 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 616.
16 See Hermer, supra note 11, at 204-08.
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genetic female, some virilizing influence that acts on the
developing embryo.17
The ambiguous genitalia of intersexed individuals are usually identified
through physical examination; however, some intersex conditions,
particularly those involving anomalous chromosomal sexes or internal
ambiguities, do not become apparent until the child is much older and
18
has undergone thorough testing.
B. The Development of the SurgicalModel
Having established the definition of "intersex" and how intersexed
conditions arise, a discussion of the type of medical treatment intersexed
individuals have traditionally received is appropriate before turning to
the arguments for and against a moratorium on the treatment. The
surgical model of care for intersexed infants developed approximately
forty years ago. 19 The model gained widespread acceptance in the
medical community by the 1970s due to the clinical "findings" of John
Money, a psychologist from Johns Hopkins Hospital. 20 Money played a
pivotal role in the medical care of patient David Reimer, known in the
psychological and medical literature as "John/Joan" or ,,j/j.21 Although
J/J was not born an intersexed individual, his case helped set the
precedent for the surgical treatment of intersexed infants in the United
States.
The infamous John/Joan case is widely recognized as the story of
two identical twin boys, one of whom (J/J) experienced the traumatic
loss of his penis at the tender age of 8 months. 22 Based on a theory that
infants are psychosexually neutral at birth, 23 Money made the following
recommendations: J/J's anatomy should be surgically refashioned to
resemble that of a female, J/J should be given female hormonal
supplements, and J/J should be raised as a normal female by his
family.24
17 American Academy of Pediatrics, Evaluation of the Newborn With Developmental
Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138, 138 (2000).
18 Hermer, supra note 11, at 196, 206, 208.
19 Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 2-3.
20
21
22
23

Id. at6, 16.
Id. at 7 n.15.
Id. at 6.
Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth, 151

ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED.,

24

Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 7-8.

298, 298 (1997).
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J/J's parents consented to Money's recommended course of action
and for the next several years they attempted to raise their "daughter" in
accordance with the prescribed treatment plan. 25 J/J's care was left to a
group of psychiatrists practicing in his geographic area, but Money
personally followed the child's development for several years, making
progress reports at least once a year. 26 According to Money's reports,
J/J satisfactorily matured as a normal girl - a seemingly perfect success
27
story.
J/J's existence as a girl seemed to prove Money's nurture theory that
intersexed infants could adapt to either gender assignment. Money's
groundbreaking work thus helped sculpt the surgical model of care for
intersexed infants. As law professor Hazel G. Beh and anatomy and
reproductive biology professor Milton Diamond put it, "

.

.

.

the

significance of the early reports of J/J's supposedly successful sex
change confirmed the apparent efficacy of this treatment as a 'standard
28
of care' for certain infants and contributed to its wide acceptance."
Money's model remained largely unquestioned until researchers
uncovered the disturbing truth behind his "findings" in the late 1990s.
In 1997, years after the physicians of America had accepted the surgical
model of care, and years after J/J had seemingly been "lost to follow
up,"-2 9 the remarkable story of the boy-turned-girl was reintroduced in
the public arena - this time, to reveal a shocking, and largely
unpredicted, twist. As Diamond and Sigmundson, a doctor associated
with the Department of Psychiatric Services at the Ministry of Health in
Victoria, British Columbia, reported in 1997, Money's reports were not
only incomplete, but also misrepresentative of J/J's true story. 30 Instead
of seamlessly adapting to the female gender, as Money had testified, J/J
had rejected "her" assigned sex as a teenager, and was living in Canada
as a married man and the adoptive father of three children. 3 1 J/J's long
journey back to his self-identified gender, and the reality behind
Money's previously acclaimed "success story" of gender assignment
surgery, is at once disturbing and disheartening.

25

Id. at 7.

26
27

Id.
Id. at 7-8.

28

Id. at 9.

29

Id. at 4.

30
31

Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 23, at 298-304.
Id. at 300; Hermer, supra note 11, at 197, 203.
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In contrast to Money's positive reports, while still young, J/J often
exhibited typical male behavior and denounced typical female behavior.
"Joan refused 'girl' toys, had little interest in girl activities, and refused
to wear dresses. .

.

. In her prepubescent years, Joan 'thought she was

a freak or something' and eventually 'figured [she] was a guy' but
'didn't want to wind up opening a can of worms.'
She
contemplated suicide." 32 In her early teenage years, Joan was often
caught standing to urinate in the girls' bathroom. 33 Finally, at age 14,
Joan made the choice to start living as a boy who is referred to in
medical literature as the pseudonym John. 34 Shortly thereafter, John's
father told John about his tumultuous medical history and the traumatic
genital injury he had suffered in infancy. 35 John later underwent
mastectomies to excise the hormone-induced breasts he had grown as a
result of Money's treatment plan, as well as penile reconstructive
surgery. 36 Because his testicles were removed during his gender
assignment surgery, John had to take male hormone replacements for the
remainder of his life. 37 He committed suicide on May 4, 2004, allegedly
38
depressed after separating from his wife and losing a job.
J/J's true story shocked the American public. It was the subject of
publications ranging from the Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent
Medicine 39 to a New York Times Bestseller, As Nature Made Him: The
Boy Who Was Raised As A Girl.n° In the last few years, many
researchers and physicians have reexamined whether the surgical model
is the best, or even an acceptable, model of treatment for intersexed
infants. 4 1 Nevertheless, Money's surgical model of care, in which an
intersexed infant's genitalia is surgically altered to conform to the

32

Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 10 (alterations in the original) (citations omitted).

33
34
35
36
37
38

id.
Id.at 11.
Id.

id.

id.
Mireya Navarro, When Gender Isn't a Given,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at Section
9,p. 1. David Jones, A Boy Called 'It,'SUNDAY MAIL (QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA), June

20, 2004, at 66.
39

Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 23.

40

JOHN COLAPINTO, As NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS RAISED As A GIRL

(2000).
4 See, e.g., Chanika Phomphutkul, et. al, Gender Self-Reassignment in an XY
Adolescent FemaleBorn With Ambiguous Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 135-37 (2000).
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gender the child will be raised42as, is still generally accepted in medical
communities across the nation.
C. The Surgical Model Under Attack
Currently, the factors that pediatric surgeons consider when
determining an intersexed infant's gender - which, under the surgical
model of care, is synonymous with the infant's surgically assigned sex include: (1) the infant's reproductive potential, (2) capacity for normal
sexual function, (3) phallus size, (4) endocrine function, (5) potential for
malignant change in sexual organs, and (6) androgen imprinting of the
brain. 43 Additionally, the infant's potential to have normal-looking
genitalia is an important factor in medical decisions. 44 New findings and
studies on the topic are constantly being published that influence the
manner in which parents and physicians balance these considerations.
They help shape the treatment model for these infants45by educating those
most responsible for applying it to real-life situations.
Unfortunately, even when surgeons pay close attention to these
factors, early gender reassignment surgery does not always secure a
positive, or even a satisfactory, result. In fact, some recent studies
suggest that gender assignment surgery can often do more harm than
good for its recipient. 46 As moratorium advocates point out, the
problems faced by recipients of gender assignment surgery are both
abundant and serious. Numerous reports describe intersexed individuals
who were assigned as females, and later declared themselves male. 47 In
addition to rejecting their assigned gender in adulthood, surgicallyassigned intersexed individuals also can experience loss of sexual
sensation, loss of sexual function, loss of reproductive potential, and
physical pain during sexual activity.4 8
Although researchers and physicians acknowledge that gender
assignment surgery does not always insure a favorable, or even a

42 Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 9, 12.
43 American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 17, at 140-41.
44 Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, supra note 13.
45 For instance, some pediatric urologists no longer assign XY individuals with
micropenis as females, at least not on a routine basis. See, e.g., id.
46 See, e.g., Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 23, at 298-304.
47 See, e.g., Phomphutkul, supra note 41.
48 Ford, supra note 4, at 483. See also Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the
Intersexed? 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 42-43 (2004).
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satisfactory, outcome, 49 academics nevertheless maintain that the
imposition of a moratorium on early gender assignment surgeries is
"extreme in that the delay will produce as many or more problems for
the majority of patients as surgery in infancy creates." 50

In addition,

they routinely argue that gender assignment is worthwhile, citing gender
assignment successes. 51 Based on these arguments, academics insist that
reassignment surgery should remain a viable form of treatment for
intersexed infants. Sharing this opinion, the American Academy of
Pediatrics published a recommendation in April 1996 supporting early
surgical intervention. 52 Although the Board later modified its position in
recognition of the substantial debate over early gender assignment
53
surgery, it continues to approve of the surgical model of care.
Other researchers state that a broad moratorium on early surgery
"ignores the potential for psychosocial harm to intersex children when
years pass before decision-making is finalized, and ignores the strong
deference in our culture to parental discretion in decisions for and about
their children." 54 Indeed, a considerable number of recipients of gender
assignment surgery may be quite satisfied with their surgeries. At least

They further admit that certain influences, such as androgen imprinting of the brain,
have not always been given sufficient attention when assigning genders to intersexed
infants; this can result in disastrous consequences for the intersexed recipient of gender
assignment surgery, including rejection of the assigned sex when the individual reaches
adulthood. Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, supra note 13.
50 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 618.
51 See, e.g., Claude J. Migeon, et al., Ambiguous Genitalia With Perineoscrotal
Hypospadias in 46,XY Individuals: Long-Term Medical, Surgical, and Psychosexual
Outcome, 110 PEDIATRICS 31 (2002).
52 American Academy of Pediatrics, Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of
Male Children With ParticularReference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological
Effects of Surgery and Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590 (1996).
American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 17, at 141. The Board issued a
statement in July 2000 advocating the use of a "team" approach for the treatment of
intersexed infants that leaves open the possibility of early gender-assignment surgery.
The surgical model of care has received international support. The British Association of
Paediatric Surgeons Working Party on the Surgical Management of Children Born With
Ambiguous Genitalia recently stated that a blanket policy of delaying surgery until the
patient is old enough to consent for himself or herself would be overly restrictive,
although it acknowledged that parents of intersexed infants should be informed that
nonoperative management of intersex conditions is a viable alternative to surgery.
Blizzard, supra note 5, at 618.
54 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 619, (citing Jorge Daaboul and Joel Frader, Ethics and the
Management of the Patient with Intersex: a Middle Way, 14 J. PEDIATRIC
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM, 1575-83 (2001)).
49
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one physician has said, "My experience suggests that many, if not most,
of the people who had surgery as infants are pleased . . .-55

III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
A. Avenues Presently Being Pursuedby Moratorium Advocates
Approximately 100 to 200 pediatric surgical sex reassignments are
performed in America every year. 56 Decrying the traditional surgical
model as rooted in questionable science, many physicians, attorneys,
researchers and intersexed individuals are calling for a moratorium on
gender assignment surgeries performed on intersexed infants.57 Given
the devastating side effects that are sometimes associated with gender
assignment surgery, and all that remains unknown about how the
influences of nature and nurture actually interact to affect an infant's
sexual identity, moratorium advocates argue that gender assignment
surgery should be postponed until the individual himself can consent to
the procedure. In addition to allowing the intersexed individual to avoid
the destructive medical and sexual side effects described above, delaying
surgery might save intersexed individuals who later reject their assigned
sex from the distress of having genitals that do not comport with their
58
self-identified gender.
While they have identified the numerous problems that can result
from early gender assignment surgery, these impassioned moratorium
advocates have not yet established a unified, precise mechanism for
imposing such a moratorium, nor have they agreed upon the most
appropriate and effective type of moratorium for their cause. Some
supporters of the moratorium concentrate their efforts on educating
members of the medical community about the negative, long-term
59
outcomes of these surgeries, as well as their risks and drawbacks.
These individuals hope that education will curtail the practice of gender
assignment surgeries by inspiring self-motivated, "self-policing" within

55

Lee & Gruppuso, supra note 5.
56 Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 17.
57 See, e.g., id. at 59. See also Intersex Babies, supra note 2; Lee & Gruppuso, supra
note 5.
58 Alyssa Connell Lareau, Note, Who Decides? Genital-Normalizing Surgery on
Intersexed Infants, 92 GEO. L.J. 129, 139 (2003).
59 See, e.g., Phornphutkul, supra note 41, at 135-37.
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the medical community. That is, that education will decrease the pool of
60
medical professionals willing to perform or recommend such surgeries.
In contrast, other advocates focus on promoting public awareness of
62
61
intersex issues through the use of news broadcasts, journal articles,
websites 63 and other avenues of popular media. This form of education,
which is aimed at society rather than the medical community, endeavors
to bring an end to gender assignment surgery by promoting acceptance
of individuals who do not conform to society's gender and sexual norms.
Presumably, such an attitudinal shift will ensure that parents of
intersexed individuals don't feel societal pressure to surgically "fix"
their children, and intersexed children won't grow up feeling societal
pressure or stigma for failing to conform to traditional anatomical
appearances or gender roles.
B. TiptoeingInto the Legal Arena, and Into the Provinceof
FundamentalRights
As the dialogue over gender assignment surgery widens to include
the opinions and research of those outside the medical sphere, it is likely
that the issue of gender assignment will be increasingly framed in a legal
context. When legal scholars add their perspectives to those of
physicians, legislators and lay persons, those opposing gender
assignment surgeries will likely begin to demand legal remedies with
greater frequency.
One such remedy might be a state or federal statute that bans gender
assignment surgeries on intersexed infants, or a statute that creates a
presumption that such surgeries are improper and raise questions of civil
liability. 64 Additionally, amicus briefs submitted to cases involving
gender assignment surgeries might promote a federal ruling outlawing
gender assignment surgery on intersexed infants entirely. Moratorium
advocates also might try persuading courts to apply a "reasonable person
standard" rather than the currently-applied "reasonable professional"
standard to cases involving gender assignment surgery. 65 In determining
60 Interview with Galen M. Schauer, Pediatric Pathologist, Children's Hospitals and
Clinics in Minneapolis, Min. (Oct. 25, 2003).
61

See, e.g., Intersex Babies, supra note 2.

62

See, e.g., Beh & Diamond, supra note 7.

63

See, e.g., ISNA, supra note 3.

64 Interview with Galen M. Schauer, supra note 60.
65 Hermer, supra note 11, at 217-20. The author states, however, that while changing
the standard of care could lead to some positive changes, it would be inadequate to
resolve some of the more troubling aspects of treating intersexed children.
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whether a doctor has acted negligently under the reasonable professional
standard, the courts compare the doctors' behavior to the behavior of
other doctors operating on similar conditions; thus, under the reasonable
professional standard, the medical community establishes its own
standards. 66 However, under the reasonable person standard, the courts
consider whether a reasonable lay person would find the doctor's
treatment to be reasonable. 67 Use of this reasonable person standard
might weaken the case for gender assignment surgery by emphasizing
the opinions and experiences of patients over those of their doctors,
holding medical professionals accountable to the ideas and beliefs of
those outside the medical system, and encouraging the medical
community to reexamine whether gender assignment surgery truly is a
permissible treatment model.
Moratorium opponents, by contrast, will likely attempt to quash
efforts to pass statutes that ban or limit gender assignment surgery on
intersexed infants. Indeed, these opponents may even advocate for
judicial or statutory protection of a parent's right to seek gender
assignment surgery for their intersexed infants, or seek to strengthen the
common judicial practice of applying a reasonable professional standard
of care to medical treatment cases. Indeed, the legal arguments and
avenues on both sides of the debate seem virtually endless.
Regardless of the position taken, the debate on gender assignment
surgery is complicated by the fact that there is a lack of conclusive
medical studies on the topic. 68 Although activists on both sides are
lobbying for further medical and psychological research, 69 much remains
unknown about the causes of intersex conditions and the effects of early
gender assignment surgery on intersexed children and adults. As a
result, it will be difficult to devise a recommended medical model of
care that will minimize deficiencies with gender assignment surgery
while promoting the overall future health and happiness of intersexed
infants. 70
Additional research may resolve many of the issues
surrounding gender assignment surgery.
66

Id. at 215.

68

Blizzard, supra note 5, at 620.

69

See Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 47.

67

Id.

70 The following findings might bear significantly on whether gender assignment
surgery is an acceptable, reasonable, and ultimately, constitutional form of medical
treatment: whether the surgery is primarily cosmetic or health-related in nature; whether
the surgery can be performed with a minimal negative impact on the intersexed
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IV. HISTORICAL RECOGNITION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A. General Background
While more research may resolve issues involving gender
assignment surgery, until such research becomes available, activists on
both sides of the debate would benefit from examining the Supreme
Court's reproductive rights jurisprudence, and particularly discourse on
the substantive due process right of privacy, and considering how it may
be applied to the current debate over gender assignment surgery.
The phrase "substantive due process" might appear to be a
misnomer because due process is, as the words might suggest, processoriented. That is, due process guarantees that the government will use
proper procedures when it denies a citizen life, liberty, or property. A
variety of court decisions, 7 1 however, support the idea that certain
substantive, fundamental rights are embedded in the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. These decisions hold that
those rights that are important to our nation deserve the full force of
constitutional protection, even though they are not explicitly enumerated
in the Constitution. 72 Unfortunately, it is not always easy to determine
precisely what these rights are, or how far they extend.
Courts apply a variety of approaches when they determine which
non-enumerated rights receive protection as fundamental rights. The
Supreme Court's emphasis on history and tradition is the most
prominent approach to identifying fundamental non-textual rights, yet it
is far from the only approach. 73 Some legal scholars suggest that courts'
individual's sexual function and capacity for sexual pleasure; the likely sexual
identification of individuals with various intersex conditions; the role of external
anatomy, hormones, and "nurture" in influencing an infant's sexual identification; and
the extent to which an intersexed child who grows up "uncorrected" will experience
psychological difficulties in childhood and adulthood.
I

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the privacy

right encompasses the right to buy and use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (basing a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy on the due process
right of privacy); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that the state

of Washington's ban on assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
because of its relation to a legitimate government interest).
72 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
73 Indeed, some commentators argue that history and tradition are ineffective for use
in identifying fundamental due process rights because the fundamental rights in need of
constitutional protection are precisely those that history and tradition have not usually
protected. In his dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Brennan stated:

"By describing the decisive question as whether [plaintiffs'] interest is one that has been
traditionally protected by our society ...and by suggesting that our sole function is to
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most important role is to ensure that the political process runs smoothly
and that all views are appropriately represented. 74 These scholars would
identify non-textual rights as fundamental only if they strengthened
Other
courts' commitment to "representation reinforcement. '75
authorities suggest that courts should use natural law principles when
76
identifying fundamental rights.

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court articulated the
basic legal framework for identifying which practices qualify as
substantive due process rights. The Court recognized two important
features of practices deserving protection under a substantive due
process analysis: (1) the practice is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed,"
and (2) there exists a "careful description" of the liberty interest being
claimed. 77 The Glucksberg standard arguably receives the most
attention in modem legal circles.
B. The FundamentalRight to Privacy
The substantive due process right most pertinent to the debate over
In American
gender assignment surgery is the right to privacy.
sufficiently
as
a
liberty
accepted
generally
jurisprudence, privacy is
important to be regarded as fundamental even though it is not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 78 Although certain legal
authorities, including Justice Douglas, describe privacy as emanating
from the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth
amendments, 79 courts generally have treated the right of privacy as a
substantive due process right. The right is an important focus in
80
reproductive jurisprudence, and in particular in abortion jurisprudence;
discern the society's views, the plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to confirm the importance of interests already protected by a majority of the
States. Transforming the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause into a
redundancy mocks those who, with care and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (citations omitted)

emphasis omitted).

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEw, 73-104 (1980).
75 id.
76 See, e.g., HARRY V. JAFFA, ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION, 13-54 (1994).

77
78

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.

79

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.

80

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
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this paper will explore how the arguments made in those cases can be
applied to the gender assignment surgery debate.
"As an abstract principle, privacy's logical limits forbid State
interference into the 'most basic decisions about family and parenthood,
as well as bodily integrity.' 8 1 Numerous court decisions support the
general contention that on a fundamental level, the right to privacy
protects an individual's right to be free from unwanted invasion of his or
her person. 82 Particularly in the context of reproductive rights, the right
of privacy often has been used to protect individuals' bodies from
outside invasion. While the courts have historically protected the right
of privacy as a substantive due process right, the proper scope of the
83
right is still hotly debated in legal and judicial circles.
Although the privacy right is generally considered fundamental in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, what specific actions it protects is less
clear. When determining which actions fall under the umbrella of a
fundamental right, courts often struggle with questions concerning the
degree of abstraction at which the right should be stated.84 If a
substantive due process right is stated broadly, a wide variety of actions
fall within its protection. In contrast, if the right is stated narrowly, few
85
actions will be protected.
First explicitly relied upon in Meyer v. Nebraska, the right of
privacy has been interpreted to include the right of parents to "establish a
home and bring up children," 86 and "to control the education of their
own." 87 The right of privacy also has been extended to include a
multitude of other, more specific rights, many of which are implicated in
the controversy over early gender assignment surgery. Some of the most
prominent of these rights lie in the legal arena of procreation.

81

Elizabeth Reilly, The "Jurisprudenceof Doubt": How the Premises of the Supreme

Court's Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 757,

761 (1998) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)).
82 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
83 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-68 (2003).
84 For a judicial commentary on the ways that the level of abstraction at which a right
is defined can influence whether it is protected as "fundamental," see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
85 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1977) (in which the Court
ruled that defining family rights to only include the protection of the nuclear family
would be too narrow a construction).
86 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
87

Id. at 401.
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C. Individual v. AssociationalRights
The Supreme Court has discussed the right of privacy, including the
right to control procreation, as both an individual right and an
associational right. The former describes a right that is separately vested
in each individual person, whereas the latter describes a shared right that
arises from a close relationship between individuals. The following cases
illustrate some of the primary differences between these two views of
the privacy right.
1. Skinner v. Oklahoma and Eisenstadt v. Baird:
Privacy as an Individual Right
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court struck down a state act
that allowed courts to order the involuntary sterilization of criminals
convicted on two or more counts of "felonies involving moral
turpitude. '88 Although Skinner is an equal protection case, the Court
spoke broadly about the right to procreate, characterizing it as a
fundamental due process right:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The
power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
89
whither and disappear.
Skinner describes reproductive rights as positive rights - the right to
reproduce 9° - and it strengthens the notion that the right of privacy
encompasses the right of an individual to exercise affirmative
procreative choice and to be free from procedures that improperly
infringe on a person's "basic civil right" to procreate. 91 Additionally,
Skinner illustrates that the privacy right of procreation is an individual
right that is held by every person under the law, as opposed to an
associational right that is created out of a marital relationship. The
Skinner Court says, "There is no redemption for the individual whom the
88 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
89 Id. at 541.
90 This is in contrast to cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and PlannedParenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, which paint reproductive rights as negative rights - i.e., the right
not to reproduce.

91

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535-37.
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He is forever deprived of a basic

Eisenstadt v. Baird confirmed the interpretation of Skinner as
establishing an individual, affirmative privacy right to procreate. 9 3 The
Eisenstadt Court struck down a Massachusetts law that prohibited the
sale and distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people. 94 The Court
stated that reproductive rights "must be the same for the unmarried and
the married alike" and that, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything it is
the right of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. ' 95 By recognizing that
the privacy right to buy and use contraceptives was not an associational
right, Eisenstadtframed the right as one by which individuals can make
personal decisions about procreation. While Eisenstadt is an equal
protection case and not a substantive due process case, it influenced
privacy rights jurisprudence by extending the privacy right to include the
right to be free from governmental intrusion into matters affecting the
96
decision about whether to have children.
2. Griswold v. Connecticut: Privacy as an Associational Right
In contrast to Skinner and Eisenstadt, the Court has established a
line of cases that construe the privacy right as an associational right, not
an individual right. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court extended the
privacy right to encompass the right to buy and use contraceptives. 97
92 Id. at 541. One should note that Skinner is an equal protection case, not a
substantive due process case, but nonetheless the Court spoke of the right to procreate as
a fundamental right. The case does not rely significantly on tradition or cultural norms
when identifying the affirmative, individual privacy right to procreate. This lack of
reliance suggests that history and culture are not the only ways to identify a right that
receives substantive due process protective status. American society has a traditional,
binary system of gender and forty years of history in performing gender assignment
surgery on intersexed infants. Under the standard described in Glucksberg, courts
probably would find that tradition and history do not support the "right" of intersexed
infants to avoid gender assignment surgery in the hope that they may someday procreate,
and therefore this "right" would not be given substantive due process protective status
under the standard. Under the Skinner standard, however, tradition and history do not
appear to be central to determining privacy rights, and Skinner's focus on the individual
make it more likely that under it courts would find intersexed infants have a substantive
due process right to not have gender assignment surgeries.
9' 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).

94

Id. at 453.

95

Id.

96
97

Id. at 445-53.
381 U.S 479, 485.
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Rather than framing this right as an individual right to make
reproductive choices, as the Court did in Skinner, in Griswold the Court
framed the issue as one of marital privacy and privacy in the bedroom.
Here, the Griswold Court described the privacy right of procreation as
one that arises from a close relationship and not as one that inherently
98
resides in an individual.
Despite the strong arguments in favor of familial privacy, the Court
has firmly established that the privacy right of the family unit has its
limits. In Prince v. Massachusetts,99 the Court upheld the application of
child labor laws to a young girl who had been soliciting on behalf of
Jehovah's Witnesses at the behest of her parents. While acknowledging
the existence of a "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter,''1°

the Court insisted that "family itself is not beyond regulation

in the public interest ...Acting to guard the general interest in youth's
well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control
by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's
labor and in many other ways." 10 1 Even in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a First
Amendment case which has often been cited for its fervent protection of
private decisions made within the family unit, the majority was careful
to note that the holding did not apply to situations in which there was
evidence of "any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to
the public safety, peace, order, or welfare."' 0 2 In situations where there
is evidence of such harm, the state is clearly empowered, and some
might even argue, obligated, to intrude upon the family unit in the
interests of the child.

V. APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
TO THE MORATORIUM DEBATE
As previously noted, both those who oppose and those who support
a moratorium on gender assignment surgery on intersexed infants can
find support in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. The
following section applies substantive due process doctrine to the debate
over the moratorium, first detailing what arguments moratorium
98

Id. at 479-86.

99

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

'00 Id. at 166.
101

Id.

102

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972).
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advocates can make, and then explaining what arguments moratorium
opponents can make.
A. MoratoriumAdvocates'Arguments
As discussed, under the Glucksberg standard the Court considers
two important features in determining whether a practice qualifies as a
substantive due process right: (1) the practice is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were
sacrificed," and (2) there exists a "careful description" of the liberty
interest being claimed.10 3 In the context of gender assignment surgery, a
court's determination of whether these two important features are
present or absent depends in large part on how broadly the courts choose
to define the substantive due process right.
A broadly defined substantive due process approach likely would
lead a court to conclude that intersex infants do have a substantive due
process right to be free from gender assignment surgery, and that a
moratorium on gender assignment surgery should be imposed. If the
right at issue were framed in very broad terms, such as "the individual's
right to be free from unsolicited invasions of his body," then the first
feature of the Glucksberg standard would certainly be present: America
does enjoy a long tradition of respecting an individual's right to be free
of such invasions. 104 Describing the right in broad terms would be in
line with the Court's recent trend in substantive due process
jurisprudence. 10 5 However, phrasing the right in such broad terms may
or may not allow a court to identify the second feature of the Glucksberg
inquiry, depending on whether a "careful description" of such a right
could be articulated.
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas seems to reflect a
broad judicial approach to the description of substantive due process
rights. In Lawrence, the Court considered the right of privacy as a
broad, individual right that encompasses a person's privacy of sexuality
and sexual expression. The Court stated:

103 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
104 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (in which the Court includes the right to
"bodily integrity" in a list of privacy interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
105 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-68 (in which the Court acknowledged that it
construed the liberty interest too narrowly in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
and overruled the case).

2004]

GenderAssignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants

189

The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure,
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes,
though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior,
and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes
do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether
or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished
as criminals. 106
By defining the right as one concerning "private human conduct, sexual
behavior" instead of a right to engage in "a particular sexual act," the
Court defined the right at issue in broad terms, making it easy to
determine that the right fell within the liberty protected by the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Besides emphasizing the Court's broad approach to substantive due
process analysis in Lawrence, moratorium advocates also might argue
that Lawrence solidifies the right of privacy as an individual, not
associational, right. By acknowledging that "[t]he liberty protected by
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice," the Court recognized the right to privacy as one rooted in the
individual person, and not in a relationship. 10 7 Moratorium advocates
might assert that Lawrence also signifies a judicial willingness to protect
an individual's choice to pursue unpopular sexual practices and make
unpopular sexual decisions, even in the face of societal and familial
pressures to do otherwise. This notion lends credence to the contention
that intersexed infants should be allowed to make their own decisions
regarding sexuality, including the decision of whether to undergo gender
assignment surgery, and consequently supports the imposition of a
moratorium on gender assignment surgery.
Finally, moratorium advocates should note that the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that an individual's minority status does not bar him
from asserting the privacy right of procreation. As the Court stated in
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I/): "[a] child, merely on account of his
minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution."' 0 8 Although
the Court has asserted that "the constitutional rights of children cannot
106
107
108

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
Id. (emphasis added).
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
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be equated with those of adults,"' 1 9 applying the Court's language to the
issue at hand, it is clear that while intersexed infants may not enjoy the
full legal status of adults, they do possess some reproductive rights
deserving of constitutional protection.
B. Moratorium Opponents' Arguments
In contrast to moratorium advocates who should present the privacy
right at issue broadly, those opposing a moratorium on early gender
assignment surgery should present the right narrowly. A narrowly
defined substantive due process right would likely lead a court to
conclude that intersex infants do not have a substantive due process right
to be free of gender assignment surgery, and that a moratorium on
gender assignment surgery should not be imposed. If the right at issue
were described in very narrow terms, such as "an intersex baby's right to
be free of gender assignment surgery," the description would probably
be "careful" enough to satisfy the second prong of the Glucksberg
analysis. However, the first prong of the Glucksberg inquiry would
probably not be met, for the right to be free from gender assignment
surgery is decidedly not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" (indeed, up until recently the standard of care has been to
perform such surgeries on intersexed infants).
In addition to construing the right of privacy in narrow terms, those
opposing a moratorium on early gender assignment surgery can support
their opposition by framing the issue in terms of the privacy right to
procreate, but construing the privacy right to procreate as an
associational right.
This associational approach has important
implications for the issue at hand. By conceptualizing the privacy right
to procreate as one arising from a personal relationship, and not one that
is vested in individuals, the Griswold decision lends support to
moratorium opponents by drawing the privacy right away from the
intersexed infant and giving the right to the applicable close relationship
- that between the infant and his or her parents. Indeed, the right of
privacy has been extended to protect not just the intimate marital arena
that Griswold sheltered from undue state interference, but also the
autonomy of the family unit as well.11 0
With this shift in focus from the privacy of the individual to the
privacy of the relationship, it is easier to argue that the parent of an
109
110

Id. at 634.
See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
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intersexed infant - being an integral part of the infant-parent relationship
from which the privacy right of procreation springs under Griswold's
associational model"' 1 - should have decisionmaking power with respect
to surgeries that might adversely affect his or her intersexed infant's
reproductive potential. In the face of controversial medical treatment
models that still require testing for their overall effectiveness, potential
side effects, and risks to the patient, the privacy right of the parents to
make decisions concerning the infant's private life may reign supreme.
In addition, critics might argue that the privacy right to procreate,
even though established in due process jurisprudence, is inapplicable to
the context of early gender assignment surgeries because intersexed
infants do not yet possess reproductive rights due to their minority
status. In Bellotti II, in which the Court stated that children are not
beyond the protection of the Constitution merely because they are
minors, the Court acknowledged the difficulties inherent in reconciling
the reduced legal status of pregnant minors - still under the control of
their parents - with the rights to bodily privacy recognized by cases such
as Roe v. Wade1 12 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.113 Settling on a
balancing test, the Court identified three reasons why "the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
114
child rearing."
The reasons the Court identified in Belloti II as to why children's
constitutional rights cannot be equated with adults can be used by
moratorium opponents to argue that the decision over gender assignment
surgery should not be left until intersexed individuals are old enough to
consent to surgery. By emphasizing the Belloti II Court's recognition of
the differences between children and adults under the Constitution,
moratorium opponents can argue that an intersexed infant's right to
bodily integrity and procreative liberty may not be equal to the rights of
adults, and therefore might not demand the same application of Roe,
Planned Parenthood,and Griswold. Given "the inability" of children
"to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner," moratorium

III

See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479-86.
112 Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (basing a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy
on the due process right of privacy).
113 Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (holding that a provision of a Pennsylvania statute that
required a married woman to notify her husband before having an abortion was invalid).
11

Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634.
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opponents might argue that the medical decisions affecting the rights to
procreation (such as the decision concerning gender assignment surgery)
should be properly left to the parents, who play such an "importan[t]
role" in "child rearing."
C. Additional Considerations
In addition to the concerns addressed above, the debate over gender
assignment surgery often involves heated discussion about whether such
115
surgery is performed for cosmetic reasons or health reasons.
Ordinarily, those supporting early gender assignment surgeries portray it
as solving health concerns, while those opposing the surgeries portray it
as unnecessary and cosmetic. 116 However, even if gender assignment
surgery is portrayed as being performed for health reasons, moratorium
advocates can make arguments to support their position. In Roe v.
Wade, perhaps the most celebrated and reviled privacy decision of the
20th century, the Court held that the right of privacy "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy," 117 but was careful to add that this right must be balanced
against the important state interests in the potential life of the fetus and
the mother's health.11 8 Moratorium advocates might emphasize that Roe
lends support to the argument that the state may regulate or outlaw
medical procedures in order to protect an individual's health. Thus, the
state can regulate gender assignment surgery in order to protect the
infant's future health.1 19 Such regulation could include a moratorium on
0
performing gender assignment surgeries on infants.12
115 See, e.g., Lee & Gruppuso, supra note 5.
116 See e.g.,id.
117 Roe, 410 U.S. at 161-62.
118 Id. at 162. In ruling that the mother's right to privacy in the abortion context is
circumscribed by the state's interest in the mother's health, the Court demonstrated that
society, through the arm of the State, is empowered to protect an individual's health
based on its own standards and definition of "health," and not based on the individual's
ersonal conception of the terms.
19 As previously noted, gender assignment surgery can result in a loss of sexual
sensation, loss of sexual function, loss of reproductive potential, and physical pain
during sexual activity. Ford, supra note 4, at 483; Haas, supra note 48, at 42-43.
120 Moratorium opponents, on the other hand, may argue that gender assignment
surgery promotes the state's interest in protecting the health of intersexed infants. They
might use Roe to bolster their argument by emphasizing that the Roe Court's definition
of "health" is not limited to an individual's physical well being. The Roe Court
acknowledged that the term "health" can include a person's mental and emotional health
as well: "[mlaternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
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On the other hand, moratorium opponents might be more likely to
prevail on their arguments that the decision is best left to the private
realm of the infant's family and physicians, rather than to an overbroad
moratorium, by also framing the decision in a medical, health-related
context. As one scholar wrote when discussing the Court's historical
treatment of the abortion right:
The cases vacillate between characterizing the
[abortion] decision as medical or moral... the more the
Court characterizes the decision as medical, the more it
belongs to doctors, and the stronger the protection likely
to be given to the right. The more the decision is cast in
moral terms, the more it belongs to society, and the
weaker the protection given against restrictions and
burdens designed to influence the woman's decision...
121

Against the backdrop of the Roe decision, then, it appears that the more
that early gender-assignment surgery is framed as a medical, "health"
procedure, the more control and discretion physicians and family
members might have over the decision.
Another concern that moratorium opponents could point out is that a
moratorium on such surgery may not actually help the individuals it
aims to protect. While gender assignment surgery has the potential to
trample on the privacy rights of intersexed infants and modem privacy
jurisprudence helps moratorium advocates by construing the privacy
right as an individual right, those supporting the practice of gender
assignment surgery could argue that the imposition of a blanket
moratorium would undoubtedly be both overinclusive and
underinclusive. Moratorium advocates often rely on the following logic:
since physicians cannot always accurately predict the gender with which
an intersexed infant will identify, and since gender assignment surgery
often carries with it undesirable side effects and risks, surgeons should
always refrain from performing gender assignment surgery until the
individuals are old enough to provide their own consent to it. In
unwanted child." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. This attention to the mental health of the
individual exhibits a broad judicial view that takes into account the emotional distress
and future happiness of an individual. Since some moratorium opponents assert that
delaying gender assignment surgery may result in psychosocial harm to intersexed
individuals, they may argue that the surgery promotes the state's interest in protecting
the health of intersexed individuals.
121 Reilly, supra note 8 1, at 773.
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addition, some intersexed individuals, because of their particular medical
condition, personality, and familial situation, might easily identify with a
gender and be unaffected by peer pressure and their conspicuous
nonconformity with sexual norms. These individuals might prefer to be
spared gender assignment surgery until they are mature enough to make
a gender choice for themselves.
Nevertheless, a moratorium on surgery would be grossly
overinclusive because it would deny
all intersexed infants the
opportunity to undergo surgery until they were old enough to
competently choose surgery for themselves - including those infants
who, because of their particular psychological compositions, family
environments, communities, and sensitivities to peer pressure, would
have benefited psychologically and physically from early surgery. In
contrast to those individuals who would have preferred to wait to have
gender assignment surgery, there are those individuals who are happy to
have undergone the surgery in infancy.122 For these individuals, at least,
early surgery was the appropriate, and perhaps best, response to their
intersex condition. Hence, a moratorium on gender assignment surgery
would be overinclusive because it would impose a value judgment on all
intersexed infants - that growing up without surgery is better than
growing up with it. It would presuppose that every intersexed individual
would choose to grow up as closely as possible to the way nature made
him or her, regardless of the psychological and physical difficulties and
social mores he or she might encounter by having ambiguous genitalia.
A moratorium on gender assignment surgery would treat all intersexed
individuals as having the same desires and needs when, in fact, they may
have very different ones. 123 Some intersexed individuals might view
their right of privacy as one that they share with their parents, which
their parents may exercise on their behalf to elect surgery. A
122

Lee & Gruppuso, supra note 5.

123

This concern that a regulation may be overinclusive is reflected in Chief Justice

Stone's concurrence in Skinner: "Moreover, if we must presume that the legislature
knows - what science has been unable to ascertain - that the criminal tendencies of any
class of habitual offenders are transmissible regardless of the varying mental
characteristics of its individuals, I should suppose that we must likewise presume that the
legislature, in its wisdom, knows that the criminal tendencies of some classes of
offenders are more likely to be transmitted than those of others. And so I think the real
question we have to consider is ... whether the wholesale condemnation of a class to an
invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity to any individual to show that his is not
the type of case which would justify resort to it, satisfies the demands of due process."
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 544. (Stone, J., concurring).

2004]

Gender Assignment Surgeryfor IntersexedInfants

195

moratorium would prevent individuals who would benefit from early
surgery from receiving it - and might therefore do more harm than good.
A moratorium on gender assignment surgery would be not only
overinclusive, but also underinclusive, because it could not cover all of
the individuals it seeks to protect. One of the main concerns among
moratorium advocates is that a surgically-assigned child will reject his
or her gender as an adult. However, this possibility is not limited to
intersexed individuals. Many people born without a medically-detected
intersex condition later declare that the sex they were born into does not
adequately reflect their self-identified gender. Some of these people
even choose to undergo sex-assignment surgery in order to make their
outward appearance comport with their self-identified gender. A
moratorium on gender assignment surgeries for intersexed infants would
do nothing to address these concerns, and would therefore be limited in
its effectiveness.
Finally, the debate over early surgery brings up additional concerns
that have not yet been addressed in the Court's privacy jurisprudence.
Yoder and Griswold describe circumstances in which the wishes of the
familial unit conflict with societal norms that the state is trying to
protect. A moratorium on early gender assignment surgeries, by
contrast, involves a situation where both family wishes and societal
norms may support gender assignment surgery, but the privacy rights of
the intersexed infant are said to be in need of separate Constitutional
protection. In Yoder and Griswold, there is one conflict at issue:
traditional societal values clashing with privacy rights, whether
individual or associational. In the case of a moratorium, the same
conflict is present, but there is an additional element: the conflict
between individual and associational rights. A court must examine both
the tension between the views of the state and the privacy rights of the
family unit, as well as the tension between the associational privacy
rights of the family and the individual privacy rights of the intersexed
infant. This additional element serves to further complicate the
application of privacy jurisprudence.

VI. CONCLUSION
A "natural parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children is an interest far more
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precious than any property right." 124 As much as the right to privacy can
bolster the arguments of moratorium advocates, it also supports the
arguments that favor gender assignment surgery.
The historic utilization of the surgical model of care, a binary
conception of gender, and the legitimate concerns that individuals raised
with "uncorrected" ambiguous genitalia might have growing up all seem
to oppose a moratorium on gender assignment surgery. In addition, the
medical literature and the Supreme Court's substantive due process and
privacy decisions appear to oppose a legal imposition of a moratorium
on gender assignment surgery. Given the numerous anecdotes that have
been gathered from intersexed adults who have experienced positive
outcomes from their gender assignment surgery, it would be premature
for a court or legislature to decide, in the absence of conclusive findings,
that gender assignment surgery is detrimental to intersexed infants and
that a moratorium on early gender assignment surgery is warranted. It is
simply too extreme to declare, at this point in time, that the privacy
rights of intersexed infants require that their parents raise them with
ambiguous genitalia, no matter how the infants' families or surgeons feel
about that decision and no matter what the sexual norms are of society.
However, the predominant surgical model of treatment might require
revision, as it fails to meet the needs of many intersexed individuals.
Only by exploring and examining privacy arguments will society be able
to develop a strong and effective treatment model for infants born with
intersex conditions - a model that fully integrates both the medical and
legal aspects of gender assignment surgery, and is consistent with
America's substantive due process jurisprudence concerning the right of
privacy.
Regardless of whether the arguments of moratorium opponents or
proponents appear the most legitimate at this juncture, both should
incorporate substantive due process arguments and privacy rights
jurisprudence into their dialogue. As the debate over early gender
assignment surgery moves into the legal arena, both sides must work to
understand the substantive due process and privacy considerations that
surround the surgery. Only then will they be equipped to fully
comprehend the legal implications of the surgery and devise a model of
care that adequately addresses the concerns of intersexed infants and
their families.
124

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).

